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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SA VIN GS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation, 
vs. 
WELLS R. KING, et al., 




GEORGE W. EV ANS and MARTHA R. 
EV ANS, his wife, 
Defendants and 
Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 
11316 
Respondents recognize that the Statement of Facts as 
set forth in Appellant's Brief is accurate insofar as it goes. 
However, because of omission of certain facts which Re-
spondents feel are important, Respondents desire to supple-
ment Appellant's State of Facts as to some details. 
The Maurer Development Corporation, as seller, en-
tered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Wells R. 
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King and his wife on February 1, 1962 for the sale of a par-
cel of ground described as: 
"Lot 3, Kings Village Subdivision, according to the 
official plat thereof; measuring 55.25 feet wide by 
115 feet dept. Also known as 620 Garden Avenue, 
Salt Lake City, Utah." 
The contract of sale recited that at that time there was "an 
obligation against said property in favor of Prudential Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association .... " 
On August 15, 1962, as part of a larger real estate trans-
action, the Kings assigned their interest as buyers in the 
contract to George W. Evans and his wife (respondents 
herein) and concurrently the Evans assigned their interest 
in the said contract to James T. Rice and Preston Norton 
and their wives. Rice and Norton were the real estate broker 
and salesman who handled the whole transaction. However, 
the document evidencing the latter assignment was dated 
August 18, 1962. 
Subsequently, on September 7, 1962 the Rices assigned 
their interest in the said contract to the Nortons, who sub-
sequently assigned their interest to one George Peterson, 
on February 15, 1963. 
All assignments were executed on the standard form ap-
proved by the Utah State Securities Commission and the 
Utah State Realty Association. That form of assignment 
contains a clause which states as follows: 
"3. That in consideration of the assignors execut-
ing and deliveTing this agreement, the assignees 
covenant with the assignors as follows: 
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a. That the assignees will duly keep, observe 
and perform all of the terms, conditions and 
provisions of the said agreement that are to 
be kept, observed and performed by the as-
signors. 
b. That the assignees will save and hold harm-
less the assignors of and from any and all 
actions, suits, costs, damages, claims and de-
mands whatsoever arising by reason 'of an act 
or omission of the assignees." 
There is no other wording in the assignment which relates 
to any assumption of the balance due under the contract or 
an agreement to pay the same. 
On November 27, 1963 Prudential Federal Savings and 
Loan Association accepted a deed to the property from 
Maurer Development Corporation, in lieu of a foreclosure 
of its prior obligation recited in the contract. Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan Association also took an assign-
ment of the rights of Maurer Development Corporation as 
vendor under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Sometime subsequent to the assignment from the Rices 
to the Nortons, and prior to the deed from Maurer Develop-
ment Corporation to Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, an amended description was attached to the 
contract by stapling. The amended description, which was 
initialed by the Maurer Development Corporation and by 
Preston L. Norton and his wife, sets forth a metes and 
bounds description of the property 'and also contains a state-
ment that Kings Village Subdivision was an unrecorded 
suhdivi$ion. 
On or about August 16, 1966, Prudential Federal Sav-
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ings and Loan Association commenced the present action, 
alleging that a default occurred on or about September 1, 
1965; that it was electing to treat the contract as a note and 
mortgage; and "to pass title to the buyer subject thereto" 
and to foreclose the same. In its Complaint, Prudential Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association also alleged that these 
Respondents and the other subsequent assignees had "as-
sumed and agreed to pay and discharge all of the buyer's 
obligations under said contract", which was denied by the 
Respondents in their Answer. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIS-
MISSING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR DEFICENCY 
AGAINST THESE RES'PONDENTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR DEFICIENCY A'GAINST 
THESE RESPONDENTS. 
The view has often been expressed that for all practical 
purposes the relationship of seller and purchaser under an 
executory contract for the sale of land is equivalent to that 
of a mortgagor-mortgagee. See Ferguson vs. Blood, 152 Fed. 
98 (1907); Harris vs. Halverson, 192 Wis. 71 211 N. W. 295 
(1927 ). 
It is also well setted that the acceptance of an assign-
ment of the purchaser's interest under a real estate con-
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tract does not place the assignee in privity of contract with 
the seller. In Adron vs. Evans, 217 N. W. 397 (So. Dakota 
1927) the Court stated as follows: 
"The assignment contains no promise or agreement 
on the part of Evans to pay anything. The assign-
ment of a contract for the sale o.f real estate does not 
create a personal liability on the part of the as-
signee without a provision to that effect. The as-
signee cannot require conveyance of the land to him 
without payment of the contract price, but he is no;t 
personally liable for that price unless he agrees or 
promises to pay it." 
The courts have reasoned that a stipulation in the orig-
inal contract, on the part of the purchaser, to pay the price 
is a personal and not a real convenant, and that it does not 
pass with the purchaser's equitable interest. This is so, even 
though the original contract contains a provision purporting 
to bind the assigns of the original purchas·er. In Lisenby vs. 
Newton, 120 Cal. 571, 52 Pac. 813 (1898), the Court said: 
"There are authorities which deny that a covenant 
can in any case run with an equity, or without a 
legal estate in the land; we need not inquire what 
limitations attend the principle, for it is clear that 
the promise to pay the agreed price in a contract for 
the purchase of real estate is not of itself a covenant 
accompanying the equitable interest of the purchaser 
into the hands of his assignee." 
In Meyer vs. Droegemueller, 165 Minn. 245, 206 N. W. 
391 (1925) the court stated: 
"An assignment by the vendee of a contract for the 
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purchase of real estate creates a privity of estate be-
tween the assignee and the original vendor, but not 
a privity of cont.ract. It does not relieve the original 
vendee from his contractual obligations to the nn-
dor or impose upon the assignee any personal liabil-
ity for the unpaid purchase price, unless he assumed 
and agreed to pay it. That the original contract pur-
ports to bind the parties thereto, and their represent-
atives and assigns, does not change the rule; neither 
does the fact that the assignee has been, or is, in 
possession of the land." (Emphasis added) 
The rule is different, of course, as in the case of mort-
gage foreclosures where the assignee specifically assumes 
the obligation and agrees to pay it. Such is the case in the 
principal cases cited by the Appellant in its Brief. For ex-
ample, in the case of Lonas vs. Metropolitan Mortgage and 
Securities Company, 432 P. 2d 603 (Alaska, 1967 ), which is 
quoted on page 6 of the Appellant's Brief, the excerpt 
quoted by Appellant states as follows: 
"In the assignment from the Becks to appellants, 
signed by both parties, the appellants agreed with 
the Becks that 'they will pay the balance due on said 
real estate contract and that the balance due there-
on will be the obligation of the assignees' and that 
appellants 'would observe and perform all of the 
terms, conditions and covenants mentioned in said 
contract' .... " (Emphasis added) 
in that case, there was an express assumption, in unequivo-
cal language, which indicated that the assignees understood 
and agreed that they were assuming the obligation of pay-
ing the balance due. 
So also in the case of Barberich vs. Pooshichian, 211 
7 
Pac. 236 (Cal. App. 1922), the Court, in its opinion, stated 
that no evidence was offered at the trial on th:e question of 
whether there had been an assumption by the assignee. How-
ever, the Court also pointed out that the plaintiff had al-
leged in its complaint that defendants had assumed the ob-
ligations of the contract, which allegations were not de-
nied by the defendants. Consequently, in the Barberich case 
there was no controverted issue before the court as to 
whether the defendants had assumed the payment. The same 
cannot be said of this case, however, since the defendants 
(respondents herein) did controvert similar allegations in 
plaintiff's complaint. 
There is no real dispute between the parties as to the 
significant of the holdings of the cases cited as they apply 
to the facts of each case. The real question before this 
Court is whether Paragraph 3 of the Assignment constitutes 
an assumption on the part of a subsequent assignee to pay 
the balance due under the original contract. As stated by 
this Court in the case of Radley vs. Smith, 6 Utah 2d. 314, 
313 P.2d 465 (1957): 
"While it is no doubt possible for a party to become 
the assignee of the rights und,er a contract without 
becoming responsible for the dutfes, the que'stion 
whether a purported assignment of an entire con-
tract includes such assumption depends upon its 
terms and the intent of the parties. Whenever un-
certainty or ambiguity exists with respect thereto it 
is proper for the court to consider all of the facts 
and circumstances, including the words and actions 
of the parties forming the background of the trans-
action." 
The real question then involves a determination in each 
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particular case as to whether or not an asswnption was in-
tended by the parties by the words contained in Paragraph 
3. Respondents respectfully submit that it is difficult to 
ascertain the intention of the parties where a standard 
form is used which does not clearly set out the obligations 
of the parties. It is respectfully submitted that the average 
layman would consider a real estate contract as an alterna-
tive to, and as roughly the equivalent of a mortgage in se-
curing a real esta'te purchase. Indeed, as noted above, the 
courts themselves have generally tended to minimize the 
differences so as to consider them alternative means to the 
same ends. The average layman would probably understand 
the classical wording of a mortgage assumption (" ... which 
the grantee assumes and agrees to pay") as making him li-
able to the seller for the balance of the purchase price. This 
wording is well established through long usage and com-
mon familiarity in real estate transactions. However, Para-
graph 3 supra contains no mention of any agreement on the 
p'art of the assignee to "assume" or "pay" the balance due. 
By its literal terms, Paragraph 3 provides as follows: 
"3. That in consideration of the assignors executing 
and delivering this agreement, the assignees 
covenant with the assignors as follows: 
a. That the assignees will duly keep, observe 
and perform all of the terms, conditions and 
provisions of the said agreement that are to 
be kept, observed and performed by the as-
signors. 
b. That the assignees will save and hold harm-
less the assignors of and from any and all 
actions, suits, costs, damages, claims and de-
9 
mands whatsoever arising by reason of an act 
or omission of the asignees." 
Respondents respectfully submit that Paragraph 3, when 
read together as a whole, constitutes a hold-harmless agree-
mnt-that is, it is an agreement between the assignor and 
the as1signee that the assignee will do the things required 
of the assignor under the contract and if he fails to do so 
will hold :the assignor harmless from his default. As such 
the hold-harmless agreement is a personal agreement in the 
nature of an indemnity between the assignor and the as-
signee and cannot be assigned by either. There is nothing 
about the wording of Paragraph 3 which would manifest 
any intention on the part of either the assignor or the as-
signee to benefit any third person who is not a party to the 
contract. This is an essential element, which Appellant must 
establish, since it seeks directly as a third party to· enforc·e 
the terms of an agreement to which it was not a party. 
In the case of Montgomery vs. Rief, 15 Ut. 495, SO Pac. 
623 (1897) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"To entitle a third party, who may be benefitted by 
the performance of a contract, to sue, there must 
have been an intention on the part of the contracting 
parties to secure some direct benefit to him, or there 
must be some privity and some obligation or duty 
from the promisor to the third party which will en-
able him to enforce the contract, o·r some equitable 
claim to the benefit resulting from the promise or 
the performance of the contract, and there must be 
some legal right on the part of the third party to 
adopt and claim the benefit of the promis·e or con-
tract. 'To entitle him to an action,' said Mr. Justice 
Rapallo in Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 'the con-
tract must have been made for his benefit. He must 
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be the party intended to be benefited.' 'But it is 
not every contract for the benefit of a third person 
that is enforceable by the beneficiary. It must ap-
pear that the contract was made and was intended 
for his benefit. The fact that he is incidentally 
named in the contract, or that the contract, if carried 
out according to its terms, would inure to his bene-
fit, is not sufficient to entitle him to demand its 
fulfillment. It must appear to have been the inten-
tion of the parties to secure to him personally the 
benefit of its provisions'." 
Judged by the foregoing law, it would appear that there is 
nothing in the assignment which would indicate any in-
tention on the part of the Kings or the Evans to benefit 
the original vendor under the contract, and particularly 
there would be no intention to benefit Prudential Federal 
Savings and Loan Association, which at the time of the as-
signmen't was a mortgagee of the original vendor. 
In considering "all of the facts and circumstances, in-
cluding the words and acts of the parties forming the back-
ground of the transaction" (a!s per the Radley case, su,pra) 
it would appe'ar that Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Association is really only trying to upgrade the mortgage 
which it originally held. It would be rather far-fetched for 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association to assert 
that either the original purchaser or any of their subsequent 
assignees had assumed the sellers mortgage and agreed to 
pay the balance due thereon. In reality, Prudential Federal 
Savings and Loan Association is attempting to do indirectly 
what it could not do directly. 
In considering all of the facts and circumstances, it is 
clearly established by the acts of the parties that the Evans 
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never intended to take possession of the real es:tate which 
was the subject matter of the contract, for they assigned 
their interest in the contract to the real estate agents who 
negotiated the transaction for them immediately upon re-
ceiving the assignment. 
In its Brief, Appellant has asserted that the Court er-
roneously disregarded an assignment of claims made by the 
Kings to Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association. 
However, this assignment purports to assign the benefits 
of the hold-harmless agreement between the Kings and the 
Evans, which is not assignable, as a matter of law. Further-
more, the assignment was made approximately 7 months 
after the commencement of the foreclosure action and after 
the Kings (who never filed an Answer in this matter) were 
in default. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the trial court did not err in dismissing the claim of 
Pruden'tial Federal Savings and Loan Association for a de-
ficiency judgment against Respondents, and it is respect-
fully urged that this Court affirm the decision of the trial 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN G. MARSHALL 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
Suite 721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
